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Interest Equilibrium and Path Choice in the Development of Construction Land Decrement: A Theoretical Analysis Based on the Multi-Agent Game Model

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  • Zhifa Jiang

    (School of Management, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350118, China
    Technology Innovation Center of Monitoring and Restoration Engineering in Southeast Ecologically Fragile Areas of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Fuzhou 350108, China)

  • Qiang Li

    (School of Urban Economics and Public Administration, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China)

  • Wei Gao

    (School of Urban Economics and Public Administration, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China)

  • Huiyue Su

    (School of Management, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350118, China
    Technology Innovation Center of Monitoring and Restoration Engineering in Southeast Ecologically Fragile Areas of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Fuzhou 350108, China)

  • Yuansuo Zhang

    (College of Applied Arts and Science, Beijing Union University, Beijing 100191, China)

Abstract

High-quality development is a new-era requirement for modern urban construction. The implementation of construction land decrement has become an inevitable choice to solve the urban land use dilemma and achieve high-quality social and economic development. It is a game process for stakeholders. Based on the multi-agent game model, this research analyzes the game relationship and strategy selection between governments, government and farmers, government and developers, and developers and farmers and examines the balance of interests among multiple subjects. From the perspective of space dimension, index dimension, use dimension and time dimension, a game path is constructed for construction land decrement. The research shows the following: There is a clear relationship between the supervision cost of the higher-level government and the intensity of rewards and punishments for the lower-level government and the implementation of the decrement. The district (county) government’s compensation plan and farmers’ perceptions of the success of the boycott will affect the strategic choices of both parties. Governments at all levels play a direct role in restraining development behavior and supervising rent-seeking behavior after developers intervene in volume reduction. It also proposes optimizing the ratio of game factors such as costs, benefits, rewards, verification and punishment to achieve the game equilibrium of the expression of the interests of village residents, developers and governments at all levels. Based on the path planning and coupling of response, the multi-scheme dynamic path selection for the development of construction land decrement is realized.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhifa Jiang & Qiang Li & Wei Gao & Huiyue Su & Yuansuo Zhang, 2023. "Interest Equilibrium and Path Choice in the Development of Construction Land Decrement: A Theoretical Analysis Based on the Multi-Agent Game Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-18, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:6:p:4734-:d:1090213
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Wenwen Sun & Daisuke Murakami & Xin Hu & Zhuoran Li & Akari Nakai Kidd & Chunlu Liu, 2023. "Supply–Demand Imbalance in School Land: An Eigenvector Spatial Filtering Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(17), pages 1-14, August.
    3. Guangyu Li & Shaohua Wu & Heyuan You & Chengcheng Wang, 2025. "Governments’ behavioral strategies in cross-regional reduction of inefficient industrial land: learned from a tripartite evolutionary game model," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 12(1), pages 1-17, December.

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