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A game theory approach to land acquisition conflicts in Pakistan

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  • Shafi, Ahsan
  • Wang, Zhanqi
  • Ehsan, Muhsan
  • Riaz, Faizan Ahmed
  • Ali, Muhammad Rashid
  • Xu, Feng

Abstract

Rapid urbanization in Pakistan requires new public infrastructures, which necessitates land acquisitions. However, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LAA, 1894) is primitive, recessive, complex, and prone to land conflicts, requiring systematic research exploring the logic of the legal conduct. This paper converts LAA, 1894 into an extensive-form game to explain the logic of land acquisition conflicts in Pakistan, as incumbents interact strategically. The Nash equilibrium (NE) of the extensive-form game suggests Land Acquisition Collector has an absolute advantage over settlers, reasoned by flawed compensation assessment. Thus, a bad win-win situation induces illegitimate behavior, extending the paper to Artificial Price Hike and Corruption-based game models. The mixed-strategy NE of both models suggests that illegitimate behaviors remain unchecked because of the high litigation costs, lack of transparency, the informality of land, and insufficient cadastral information. Finally, the models are calibrated with current land acquisition conflicts and legal precedents in the study area. This paper provides generalized interactive game models applicable to study the logic of land conflicts amid legal and policy implementation and suggests policies to improve the land administration and legal system to manage conflicts.

Suggested Citation

  • Shafi, Ahsan & Wang, Zhanqi & Ehsan, Muhsan & Riaz, Faizan Ahmed & Ali, Muhammad Rashid & Xu, Feng, 2023. "A game theory approach to land acquisition conflicts in Pakistan," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:132:y:2023:i:c:s0264837723002685
    DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2023.106802
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    References listed on IDEAS

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