Delegation of Power and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics
This paper addresses the problem of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade policy. The central question is whether a conflictual situation exists between the interests of the member states and those of the European Commission (agency shirking), or whether the structure of delegation in itself stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage). Drawing on the principal-agent approach, I argue that agency losses are due to the structure of delegation and that the existence of multiple principals with diverging preferences facilitates agency. I find empirical evidence that the Council-Commission relationship on trade politics has different dynamics depending on the negotiating stage. In the initial negotiating stage, when defining the negotiating mandate of the Commission, the relationship is cooperative. Conflict between the Commission and the Council only breaks out in a latter stage of negotiations, when the Commission makes concessions at the international level.
|Date of creation:||15 Mar 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chad Damro, 2007. "EU Delegation and Agency in International Trade Negotiations: A Cautionary Comparison," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45, pages 883-903, November.
- Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén, 2007. "Trade Negotiations between the EU and South Africa: A Three-Level Game," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45, pages 857-881, November.
- Alasdair R. Young, 2000. "The Adaptation of European Foreign Economic Policy: From Rome to Seattle," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 93-116, 03.
- Andrew Moravcsik, 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 473-524, December.
- Paarlberg, Robert, 1997. "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(03), pages 413-444, June.
- Patterson, Lee Ann, 1997. "Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a three-level game analysis," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(01), pages 135-165, December.
- Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0212. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valerio PAPPALARDO)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.