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The Behavior Mechanism of the Urban Joint Distribution Alliance under Government Supervision from the Perspective of Sustainable Development

Author

Listed:
  • Na Zhang

    (School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China
    Institute of Artificial Intelligence, De Montfort University, Leicester LE1 9BH, UK)

  • Xiangxiang Zhang

    (School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China)

  • Yingjie Yang

    (Institute of Artificial Intelligence, De Montfort University, Leicester LE1 9BH, UK)

Abstract

Urban joint distribution is closely related to the national economy and people’s livelihood, and governments and enterprises play an active role in the process of urban joint distribution. From the perspective of government regulations, this paper explores the mechanism and evolution law of the behavior of an urban joint distribution alliance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, a model of homogeneous enterprises participating in urban joint distribution operations under the guidance of government regulations is constructed. The mechanism and follow-up of alliance behavior are analyzed through the simulation of the relationship between parameters. It is found that, firstly, from the perspective of government regulations, in the early stage of the implementation of urban joint distribution projects, when the benefits of synergetic cooperation of enterprise alliances are relatively low and the costs are relatively high, it is necessary for the government to formulate incentive policies to improve government subsidies or to increase the penalties for non-cooperation of enterprises; Once a benign logistics environment and market mechanism are formed, the cooperation benefits increase, and the costs decrease, the government can then withdraw its supervision. Secondly, in the process of establishing urban joint distribution alliance under government supervision, it is better for the enterprises to actively achieve alliance cooperation and obtain government subsidies instead of passively accepting government supervision and paying penalties, in order to promote the formation of logistics ecological environment and market mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Na Zhang & Xiangxiang Zhang & Yingjie Yang, 2019. "The Behavior Mechanism of the Urban Joint Distribution Alliance under Government Supervision from the Perspective of Sustainable Development," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(22), pages 1-20, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2019:i:22:p:6232-:d:284385
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sébastien Antoine & Cécile Sillig & Hilda Ghiara, 2017. "Advanced Logistics in Italy: A City Network Analysis," Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG, vol. 108(6), pages 753-767, December.
    2. Firdausiyah, N. & Taniguchi, E. & Qureshi, A.G., 2019. "Modeling city logistics using adaptive dynamic programming based multi-agent simulation," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 74-96.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2003. "The nature of human altruism," Nature, Nature, vol. 425(6960), pages 785-791, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Xia Cao & Dan Lv & Zeyu Xing, 2020. "Innovative Resources, Promotion Focus and Responsible Innovation: The Moderating Roles of Adaptive Governance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(7), pages 1-19, April.
    2. Wei Zhou & Feipeng Guo, 2022. "Precise Supervision of Enterprise Environmental Protection Behavior Based on Boolean Matrix Factorization under Low Carbon Background," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(13), pages 1-17, June.
    3. Chuan Zhao & Luyao Li & Hongxia Sun & Hongji Yang, 2021. "Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game of Rumor-Affected Enterprises under Demand Disruption," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-26, January.
    4. Bin Meng & Haibo Kuang & Erxuan Niu & Jing Li & Zhenhui Li, 2020. "Research on the Transformation Path of the Green Intelligent Port: Outlining the Perspective of the Evolutionary Game “Government–Port–Third-Party Organization”," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(19), pages 1-25, September.
    5. Hongxiang Zhao & Meiyan Li, 2023. "Study on Joint Distribution Mode and Evolutionary Game of Express Enterprises in Rural Areas," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-30, January.
    6. Zhang, Junxia & Li, Xingmei & Jia, Dongqing & Zhou, Yuexin, 2023. "A Bi-level programming for union battery swapping stations location-routing problem under joint distribution and cost allocation," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 272(C).

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