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Seeking Evidence of The MAGA Cult and Trump Derangement Syndrome: An Examination of (A)symmetric Political Bias

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  • Andrew S. Franks

    (Psychology, Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, Researcher, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, MI 48859, USA
    Social, Behavioral and Human Sciences, Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences, Faculty, University of Washington Tacoma, Tacoma, WA 98402, USA)

  • Farhang Hesami

    (Psychology, Social Sciences, Alumnus, Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma, WA 98447, USA)

Abstract

Three studies sought to explore the existence of (a)symmetric bias regarding Donald Trump. In Study 1, participants read one of three statements expressing different degrees of favorability toward electing the President of the United States via a National Popular Vote attributed to Trump or an anonymous source. In Study 2, participants read one of two statements either favoring or disfavoring the name change of the Washington NFL franchise, and the statement was attributed to either Trump or an anonymous source. In Study 3, Trump and Biden voters were asked to rate their support or opposition to counting all the votes in battleground states when continued counting was expected to either help Trump or Biden. Results for all three studies supported the asymmetric bias hypothesis. Trump supporters consistently showed bias in favor of the interests and ostensible positions of Trump, whereas Trump’s detractors did not show an opposing bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew S. Franks & Farhang Hesami, 2021. "Seeking Evidence of The MAGA Cult and Trump Derangement Syndrome: An Examination of (A)symmetric Political Bias," Societies, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-17, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsoctx:v:11:y:2021:i:3:p:113-:d:638676
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Stromberg, 2008. "How the Electoral College Influences Campaigns and Policy: The Probability of Being Florida," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 769-807, June.
    2. repec:cup:judgdm:v:10:y:2015:i:6:p:549-563 is not listed on IDEAS
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