Ecosystems and Their Digital Models as Factors of Algocognitive Culture and Transition to New Technological Order
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Karl Friston, 2009. "Causal Modelling and Brain Connectivity in Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging," PLOS Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(2), pages 1-6, February.
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, Decembrie.
- Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011.
"Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
- Ernst Fehr & Oliver D. Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence," NBER Working Papers 14501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fehr, Ernst & Hart, Oliver & Zehnder, Christian, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3889, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021.
"On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 15970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," MPRA Paper 106947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jordi Brandts & Matthew Ellman & Gary Charness, 2016.
"Let’s Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 943-974.
- Jordi Brandts & Matthew Ellman & Gary Charness, 2016. "Let'S Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 943-974, August.
- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2012. "Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 3883, CESifo.
- Charness, Gary & Brandts, Jordi & Ellman, Matthew, 2012. "Let’s talk: How communication affects contract design," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6z24s6rv, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2012. "Let's talk: How communication affects contract design," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 908.12, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman & Jordi Brandts, 2015. "Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," Working Papers 648, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija & Pafilis, Evagelos, 2020.
"Common ownership of public goods,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 555-578.
- Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Evagelos Pafilis, 2018. "Common Ownership of Public Goods," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 18/700, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012.
"The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure: what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hub,"
Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 285-303, May.
- Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012. "The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure : what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hu," Post-Print halshs-00683231, HAL.
- Gabriel Jobidon & Pierre Lemieux & Robert Beauregard, 2019. "Comparison of Quebec’s Project Delivery Methods: Relational Contract Law and Differences in Contractual Language," Laws, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-75, April.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023.
"Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 18048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," MPRA Paper 117065, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010.
"Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mathias Erlei & Wiebke Roß, 2013.
"Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem,"
TUC Working Papers in Economics
0009, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
- Erlei, Mathias & Roß, Wiebke, 2015. "Bounded rationality as an essential component of the holdup problem," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2015 (Bayreuth) 140886, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
- Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016.
"Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 92-107.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 10207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," MPRA Paper 90790, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija, 2012.
"Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 939-945.
- Maija Halonen, 2010. "Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 10/243, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Paul Walker, 2016. "Simple Models of a Human-Capital-Based Firm: a Reference Point Approach," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 7(1), pages 219-247, March.
- Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 19, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Faravelli, Marco & Kirchkamp, Oliver & Rainer, Helmut, 2013.
"The effect of power imbalances on incentives to make non-contractible investments,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 169-185.
- Faravelli, Marco & Kirchkamp, Oliver & Rainer, Helmut, 2013. "The effect of power imbalances on incentives to make non-contractible investments," Munich Reprints in Economics 20623, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2011. "Incentives and Innovation: A Multitasking Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 78-128, February.
- Corgnet, Brice & Martin, Ludivine & Ndodjang, Peguy & Sutan, Angela, 2019.
"On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 23-45.
- Brice Corgnet & Ludivine Martin & Peguy Ndodjang & Angela Sutan, 2019. "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting," Post-Print halshs-02393577, HAL.
- Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström [Contract Theory: On the Contributions of the 2016 Nobel Laureates Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström]," MPRA Paper 75233, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gallus, Jana & Reiff, Joseph & Kamenica, Emir & Fiske, Alan Page, 2021. "Relational Incentives Theory," MPRA Paper 109898, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Gromb, Denis & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2020.
"The paradox of pledgeability,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 591-605.
- Donaldson, Jason & Gromb, Denis & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2017. "The Paradox of Pledgeability," HEC Research Papers Series 1185, HEC Paris.
- Jason Roderick Donaldson & Denis Gromb & Giorgia Piacentino, 2017. "The Paradox of Pledgeability," Working Papers hal-01970749, HAL.
- Raghabendra Pratap KC & Dominique Olié Lauga & Vincent Mak, 2023. "Hold-up induced by demand for fairness: theory and experimental evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(4), pages 721-750, May.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016.
"The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 33-37.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 91458, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 11276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jscscx:v:12:y:2023:i:4:p:197-:d:1107361. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.