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The Agentic Perspective in Experimental Economics

Author

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  • Arturo Macías

    (Banco de España, 28014 Madrid, Spain)

Abstract

Mainstream experimental economics is characterized by its focus on theory testing and “treatment effects” on aggregate outcomes. The “agentic” alternative is concerned with the econometric specification of individual behavior. In this essay, first, a literature review of agentic experimental economics is provided, and a stylized workflow is proposed to produce and validate econometric models of individual behavior based on experimental data: (i) create a baseline (“optimal”) behavioral benchmark (by analytical means or reinforcement learning) for the considered multi-agent game, (ii) conduct experiments with human subjects, (iii) use the experimental results to characterize the structure of the deviations from the baseline behavior, and (iv) re-run the experiment with artificial agents calibrated in the previous step, and compare the outcomes with those of the human experiment. Two papers have been selected to illustrate the successful use of the proposed workflow. Finally, the relations between agent-based and experimental economics are discussed after deep learning has “tamed” the curse of dimensionality.

Suggested Citation

  • Arturo Macías, 2025. "The Agentic Perspective in Experimental Economics," Games, MDPI, vol. 16(5), pages 1-11, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:16:y:2025:i:5:p:48-:d:1744502
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Andreoni, James, 1995. "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September.
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    6. Anufriev, Mikhail & Arifovic, Jasmina & Donmez, Anil & Ledyard, John & Panchenko, Valentyn, 2025. "IEL-CDA model: A more accurate theory of behavior in continuous double auctions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    7. Arthur, W Brian, 1993. "On Designing Economic Agents That Behave Like Human Agents," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-22, February.
    8. Duffy, John & Li, Yue, 2019. "Lifecycle consumption under different income profiles: Evidence and theory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 74-94.
    9. Arifovic, Jasmina & Hua Jiang, Janet & Xu, Yiping, 2013. "Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2446-2465.
    10. Andreoni, James & Croson, Rachel, 2008. "Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 82, pages 776-783, Elsevier.
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