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The Impact of Order Effects on the Framing of Trust and Reciprocity Behaviors

Author

Listed:
  • Davood Bayat

    (Department of Psychology, I.K. International University, Qazvin 3414896818, Iran
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Hadi Mohamadpour

    (Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Tabriz, Tabriz 5166616471, Iran
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Huihua Fang

    (Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Affective and Social Neuroscience, Magnetic Resonance Imaging Center, Center for Brain Disorders and Cognitive Sciences, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, China
    Department of Psychology, University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany)

  • Pengfei Xu

    (Beijing Key Laboratory of Applied Experimental Psychology, National Demonstration Center for Experimental Psychology Education (BNU), Faculty of Psychology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
    Center for Neuroimaging, Shenzhen Institute of Neuroscience, Shenzhen 518107, China)

  • Frank Krueger

    (Department of Psychology, University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany
    School of Systems Biology, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA)

Abstract

Trust and reciprocity have paramount importance in cooperative relationships. The influence of psychological effects such as framing and anchoring on trust and reciprocity has been investigated; however, the impact of an order effect on them is still unexplored. The goal of our study was to examine how order impacts the framing of trust and reciprocity by manipulating framing and order as within- and between-subjects factors, respectively. Different groups of participants first completed two framings of the one-shot trust game (give vs. take frame) in a counterbalanced order (give first and then take second vs. take first then give second) in the role of trustors or trustees and rated the expectations of their counterparts’ decisions afterward. Our results revealed higher trust in the take than give frame in the first decision and a reverse outcome in the second decision due to strong anchoring. Reciprocity was higher in the give than take frame in the first decisions, and no difference in the second decisions was observed due to weak anchoring. Anchoring also caused an order effect in trust and reciprocity, with higher trust when the take frame was played first, and higher reciprocity when the give frame was played first. Our results contribute to our knowledge about situational factors that shape trust and reciprocity, highlighting the impact of the context of the decision environment in terms of the impact of the order on framing.

Suggested Citation

  • Davood Bayat & Hadi Mohamadpour & Huihua Fang & Pengfei Xu & Frank Krueger, 2023. "The Impact of Order Effects on the Framing of Trust and Reciprocity Behaviors," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-14, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:14:y:2023:i:2:p:21-:d:1081770
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frank Krueger, 2023. "A Yin and Yang Perspective on the Trust Game: Trust and Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-4, March.

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