IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fednci/y1997ijulnv.3no.9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Designing effective auctions for treasury securities

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Bartolini
  • Carlo Cottarelli

Abstract

Most discussions of treasury auction design focus on the choice between two methods for issuing securities--uniform-price or discriminatory auctions. Although auction theory and much recent research appear to favor the uniform-price method, most countries conduct their treasury auctions using the discriminatory format. What are the main issues underlying the debate over effective auction design?

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Bartolini & Carlo Cottarelli, 1997. "Designing effective auctions for treasury securities," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 3(Jul).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednci:y:1997:i:jul:n:v.3no.9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci3_9.html
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/leo.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Treasury Auctions," Department Discussion Papers 0709, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    2. Abbink, Klaus & Brandts, Jordi & Pezanis-Christou, Paul, 2006. "Auctions for government securities: A laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 284-303, October.
    3. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Deddy Koesrindartoto, 2003. "Treasury Auctions, Uniform or Discriminatory?: An Agent-based Approach," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 241, Society for Computational Economics.
    5. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Duke, Charlotte, 2003. "A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 446-471, November.
    6. M S Mohanty, 2002. "Improving liquidity in government bond markets: what can be done?," BIS Papers chapters,in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), The development of bond markets in emerging economies, volume 11, pages 49-80 Bank for International Settlements.
    7. Sm ali Abbas & Yuri v. Sobolev, 2009. "High And Volatile Treasury Yields In Tanzania: The Role Of Strategic Bidding And Auction Microstructure," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 77(2), pages 257-281, June.
    8. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime Zender, 2006. "Competition and cooperation in divisible good auctions: An experimental examination," Artefactual Field Experiments 00105, The Field Experiments Website.
    9. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime F. Zender, 2004. "Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination," Working Papers 2004.15, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. Alvarez, Francisco & Mazon, Cristina, 2007. "Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: A discrete model with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(1), pages 253-266, May.
    11. Bower, John & Bunn, Derek, 2001. "Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 561-592, March.
    12. Skully, David W., 1999. "The Economics Of Trq Administration," Working Papers 14584, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednci:y:1997:i:jul:n:v.3no.9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Amy Farber). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/frbnyus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.