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Financial regulatory reform: a progress report

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  • R. Glenn Hubbard

Abstract

The 2007-09 financial and economic crisis was the result of a lack of effective regulation. The author addresses the problems with regulations in effect at the time of the crisis and offers proposals for regulation reform to address future crises. He notes that reforms should be based on solid principles, including reduction of system risk and contagion and increased transparency to promote investor protection. Any new financial regulatory structure must be able to achieve these goals, while acknowledging and managing trade-offs between enhancing accountability and mitigating systemic risk from contagion.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Glenn Hubbard, 2013. "Financial regulatory reform: a progress report," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 95(May), pages 181-198.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2013:i:may:p:181-198:n:v.95no.3
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