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Origins of the Great Inflation

Author

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  • Allan H. Meltzer

Abstract

The Great Inflation from 1965 to 1984 is the climactic monetary event of the last part of the 20th century. This paper analyzes why it started and why it continued for many years. Like others, it attributes the start of inflation to analytic errors, particularly the widespread acceptance of the simple Keynesian model with its implication that monetary and fiscal policy should be coordinated. In practice, that meant that the Federal Reserve financed a large part of the fiscal deficit. This paper gives a large role to political decisionmaking. Continuation of inflation depended on political choices, analytic errors, and the entrenched belief that inflation would continue.

Suggested Citation

  • Allan H. Meltzer, 2005. "Origins of the Great Inflation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 87(Mar), pages 145-176.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2005:i:mar:p:145-176:n:v.87no.2,pt.2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard G. Anderson & Robert H. Rasche, 1999. "Eighty years of observations on the adjusted monetary base: 1918-1997," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 3-22.
    2. Bordo, Michael D. & Schwartz, Anna J., 1999. "Monetary policy regimes and economic performance: The historical record," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 149-234, Elsevier.
    3. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    4. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Steinar Holden & Fredrik Wulfsberg, 2009. "Wage Rigidity, Institutions, and Inflation," CESifo Working Paper Series 2554, CESifo.
    2. Klodiana Istrefi, 2019. "In Fed Watchers Eyes: Hawks, Doves and Monetary Policy," Working papers 725, Banque de France.
    3. Michael D. BORDO & Klodiana ISTREFI, 2019. "Why a FOMC member is a hawk or a dove? Ideology and Politics [Pourquoi un décideur est-il un « faucon » ou une « colombe » ? Idéologie et orientation politique]," Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 224.
    4. Peter M. Summers, 2005. "What caused the Great Moderation? : some cross-country evidence," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 90(Q III), pages 5-32.
    5. Weise, Charles L, 2008. "Political constraints on monetary policy during the Great Inflation," MPRA Paper 8694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Traum, Nora & Yang, Shu-Chun S., 2011. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the post-war U.S," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 140-164, January.
    7. Anthony M. Diercks & William Waller, 2017. "Taxes and the Fed : Theory and Evidence from Equities," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-104, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Taiji Harashima, 2005. "The Cause of the Great Inflation: Interactions between the Government and the Monetary Policymakers," Macroeconomics 0510026, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Nov 2005.
    9. Brian Snowdon, 2007. "The New Classical Counter-Revolution: False Path or Illuminating Complement?," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 541-562, Fall.
    10. Otmar Issing, 2010. "The development of monetary policy in the 20th century – some reflections," Working Paper Research 186, National Bank of Belgium.
    11. Sharon Kozicki & Peter A. Tinsley, 2005. "Perhaps the FOMC did what it said it did : an alternative interpretation of the Great Inflation," Research Working Paper RWP 05-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    12. Benati, Luca, 2011. "Would the Bundesbank have prevented the Great Inflation in the United States?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 1106-1125, July.

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