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Economic perspective on the political history of the Second Bank of the United States


  • Edward J. Green


The Second Bank of the United States was an institution of first-rank importance, both politically and economically, during the early nineteenth century. This article uses recent contributions to theory on industrial organization and monetary economics to argue tentatively that conflict between debtors and creditors may have played a larger role in the bank's fortunes than previously thought.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward J. Green, 2003. "Economic perspective on the political history of the Second Bank of the United States," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q I, pages 59-67.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2003:i:qi:p:59-67:n:v.27no.1

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    2. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February.
    3. Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal, 2002. "Political Intervention in Debt Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1103-1134, October.
    4. Carlos E. Zarazaga, 1993. "Hyperinflations and moral hazard in the appropriation of seigniorage," Working Papers 93-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    5. Wright, David McCord, 1953. "Langdon Cheves and Nicholas Biddle: New Data for a New Interpretation," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(03), pages 305-319, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zbyněk Revenda, 2009. "Monopoly centrálních bank a emise peněz
      [Central Bank Monopolies and Money Issuance]
      ," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2009(5), pages 579-600.
    2. Stephen F. Quinn & William Roberds, 2008. "The evolution of the check as a means of payment: a historical survey," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

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    Banks and banking; American;


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