Economic perspective on the political history of the Second Bank of the United States
The Second Bank of the United States was an institution of first-rank importance, both politically and economically, during the early nineteenth century. This article uses recent contributions to theory on industrial organization and monetary economics to argue tentatively that conflict between debtors and creditors may have played a larger role in the bank's fortunes than previously thought.
Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): Q I ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.chicagofed.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/print_publication_order_form.cfm Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February.
- Carlos E. Zarazaga, 1993. "Hyperinflations and moral hazard in the appropriation of seigniorage," Working Papers 93-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984.
"Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Wright, David McCord, 1953. "Langdon Cheves and Nicholas Biddle: New Data for a New Interpretation," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(03), pages 305-319, June.
- Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal, 2002. "Political Intervention in Debt Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1103-1134, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2003:i:qi:p:59-67:n:v.27no.1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernie Flores)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.