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Optimised management for the development of extraordinary public properties

Author

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  • Benedetto Manganelli
  • Francesco Tajani

Abstract

Purpose - – This paper aims to propose a management model of public assets within public-private partnerships which can be applied to properties subject to a possible requalification through the redevelopment and/or modification of the intended use. Design/methodology/approach - – The logic developed is described by an algorithm which borrows the mathematical tools of Operations Research to identify the solution that maximises the utility functions of the parties related to the requalification and management of a public property. The unknowns of the model are the price and concession period, while the constraints reflect the specific and reciprocal conveniences of the actors involved. Findings - – The benefits for the private investor are a reduction of the business risk, related to the lower financial outlay required by the investment, and therefore easier access to credit from banks. For the public administration, an increase in the demand of the property offered, savings in the property management costs, along with the preservation of public property. This aspect of no small importance where there is the fear of breaking up public property which local communities attach a high cultural and historic value. Practical implications - – This leads to a logical support to public administrations involved in the requalification of property assets. Originality/value - – This paper presents a strategic approach with long-term prospects, which interprets in a different way a pure concession model, which has a greater flexibility and articulation and also enriches the framework of the projects (public-private) considered necessary for the requalification of public property as well as possible urban transformation projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Benedetto Manganelli & Francesco Tajani, 2014. "Optimised management for the development of extraordinary public properties," Journal of Property Investment & Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 32(2), pages 187-201, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:jpifpp:v:32:y:2014:i:2:p:187-201
    DOI: 10.1108/JPIF-05-2013-0034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Jolanta Tamošaitienė & Hadi Sarvari & Daniel W. M. Chan & Matteo Cristofaro, 2020. "Assessing the Barriers and Risks to Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure Construction Projects in Developing Countries of Middle East," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-20, December.
    3. Manganelli, Benedetto & Tataranna, Sabina & Pontrandolfi, Piergiuseppe, 2020. "A model to support the decision-making in urban regeneration," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    4. Pierluigi Morano & Francesco Tajani & Maria Rosaria Guarini & Francesco Sica, 2021. "A Systematic Review of the Existing Literature for the Evaluation of Sustainable Urban Projects," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-17, April.

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