IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eme/jfrcpp/v18y2010i4p356-369.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Assessing effectiveness and compliance of banking boards

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Carretta
  • Vincenzo Farina
  • Paola Schwizer

Abstract

Purpose - This paper aims to develop a model to assess the effectiveness and compliance of bank boards, taking into account their unique characteristics, financial industry standards and regulations. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on the roles and effectiveness of boards and directors in the financial industry is reviewed. Findings - The main finding in the literature suggests that evaluating the effectiveness of a board must include characteristics of the entire board as well as individual contributions of directors. Practical implications - Banking boards, more than in the past, must proactively evaluate their effectiveness and compliance with existing rules. Originality/value - The paper proposes a model for assessing the effectiveness and compliance of boards and directors of banking organizations, considering their characteristics, financial industry standards and regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Carretta & Vincenzo Farina & Paola Schwizer, 2010. "Assessing effectiveness and compliance of banking boards," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 18(4), pages 356-369, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:18:y:2010:i:4:p:356-369
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/13581981011093677?utm_campaign=RePEc&WT.mc_id=RePEc
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mohamed Belkhir, 2009. "Board of directors' size and performance in the banking industry," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 201-221, April.
    2. Andres, Pablo de & Vallelado, Eleuterio, 2008. "Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2570-2580, December.
    3. John A. Wagner III, 1998. "Board Composition and Organizational Performance: Two Studies of Insider/outsider Effects," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(5), pages 655-677, September.
    4. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    5. David A. Becher & Terry L. Campbell II & Melissa B. Frye, 2005. "Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1753-1778, September.
    6. Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, 1991. "Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 16(1), pages 49-64, June.
    7. Morten Huse & Violina Rindova, 2001. "Stakeholders' Expectations of Board Roles: The Case of Subsidiary Boards," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 5(2), pages 153-178, June.
    8. Klein, April, 1998. "Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 275-303, April.
    9. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    10. Murphy, Kevin J. & Zimmerman, Jerold L., 1993. "Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 273-315, April.
    11. Andy Mullineux, 2006. "The corporate governance of banks," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 14(4), pages 375-382, November.
    12. Kose John & Yiming Qian, 2003. "Incentive features in CEO compensation in the banking industry," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 109-121.
    13. Alessandro Minichilli & Jonas Gabrielsson & Morten Huse, 2007. "Board Evaluations: making a fit between the purpose and the system," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 609-622, July.
    14. Kaplan, Steven N. & Reishus, David, 1990. "Outside directorships and corporate performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 389-410, October.
    15. Jens Hagendorff & Michael Collins & Kevin Keasey, 2007. "Bank Governance and Acquisition Performance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 957-968, September.
    16. Eisenberg, Theodore & Sundgren, Stefan & Wells, Martin T., 1998. "Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 35-54, April.
    17. Renée B. Adams & Hamid Mehran, 2008. "Corporate performance, board structure, and their determinants in the banking industry," Staff Reports 330, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Elisabetta Gualandri & Enzo Mangone & Aldo Stanziale, 2011. "Internal Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Lessons for Banks,Regulators and Supervisors," Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza (CEFIN) (Center for Studies in Banking and Finance) 0029, Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi".

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:18:y:2010:i:4:p:356-369. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Virginia Chapman). General contact details of provider: http://www.emeraldinsight.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.