Assessing effectiveness and compliance of banking boards
Purpose - This paper aims to develop a model to assess the effectiveness and compliance of bank boards, taking into account their unique characteristics, financial industry standards and regulations. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on the roles and effectiveness of boards and directors in the financial industry is reviewed. Findings - The main finding in the literature suggests that evaluating the effectiveness of a board must include characteristics of the entire board as well as individual contributions of directors. Practical implications - Banking boards, more than in the past, must proactively evaluate their effectiveness and compliance with existing rules. Originality/value - The paper proposes a model for assessing the effectiveness and compliance of boards and directors of banking organizations, considering their characteristics, financial industry standards and regulations.
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Volume (Year): 18 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Renée B. Adams & Hamid Mehran, 2008. "Corporate performance, board structure, and their determinants in the banking industry," Staff Reports 330, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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