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Developments in corporate creditworthiness around ownership events

  • Dror Parnes
Registered author(s):

    Purpose – This study seeks to explore developments in corporate creditworthiness before and after ownership events. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the Blockholders database of Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick, and three credit quantities, and deploys a standard event study methodology to examine the relation to corporate creditworthiness. Findings – The paper discovers that ownership-construction is generally associated with prior- and post-improvement in creditworthiness, while a block-destruction is typically surrounded by deterioration in corporate creditworthiness. The paper also finds proper evidence for a relation between the construction or destruction of managerial block and future developments in corporate creditworthiness. The paper further realizes that outside shareholders exhibit higher impact than inside block-holders on later variations in credit risk. Research limitations/implications – The paper is unable to conduct further robustness checks with structural credit methodologies due to the reduced number of valid observations. Originality/value – Market participants can utilize the conclusions to better predict future trends in corporate creditworthiness.

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    File URL: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1743-9132&volume=7&issue=4&articleid=1950840&show=abstract
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    Article provided by Emerald Group Publishing in its journal International Journal of Managerial Finance.

    Volume (Year): 7 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 4 (September)
    Pages: 377-396

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    Handle: RePEc:eme:ijmfpp:v:7:y:2011:i:4:p:377-396
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    1. Jennifer Dlugosz & Rudiger Fahlenbrach & Paul Gompers & Andrew Metrick, 2004. "Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement," NBER Working Papers 10671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Barclay, Michael J & Holderness, Clifford G, 1991. " Negotiated Block Trades and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(3), pages 861-78, July.
    3. Pierre Collin-Dufresne, 2001. "The Determinants of Credit Spread Changes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(6), pages 2177-2207, December.
    4. Connolly, Robert & Stivers, Chris & Sun, Licheng, 2005. "Stock Market Uncertainty and the Stock-Bond Return Relation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(01), pages 161-194, March.
    5. Singh, Manohar & Davidson III, Wallace N., 2003. "Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 793-816, May.
    6. Chen, Xia & Harford, Jarrad & Li, Kai, 2007. "Monitoring: Which institutions matter?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 279-305, November.
    7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Andrew Ang & Robert J. Hodrick & Yuhang Xing & Xiaoyan Zhang, 2004. "The Cross-Section of Volatility and Expected Returns," NBER Working Papers 10852, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Edward I. Altman, 1968. "Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis And The Prediction Of Corporate Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 23(4), pages 589-609, 09.
    10. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
    11. Merton, Robert C, 1974. "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 449-70, May.
    12. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    13. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    14. Jennifer E. Bethel & Julia Porter Liebeskind & Tim Opler, 1998. "Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 605-634, 04.
    15. Edward I. Altman & Tushar Kant & Thongchai Rattanaruengyot, 2009. "Post-Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Performance: Avoiding Chapter 22," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 21(3), pages 53-64.
    16. Edwin J. Elton, 2001. "Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 247-277, 02.
    17. Charles J. Corrado & Thomas W. Miller, 2006. "Estimating Expected Excess Returns Using Historical And Option-Implied Volatility," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 29(1), pages 95-112.
    18. James S. Ang & Rebel A. Cole & James Wuh Lin, 2000. "Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 81-106, 02.
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