The political economy of revenue pressure and tax collection efficiency
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to develop a political-economy model to show how political imperatives lead to reforms in administering direct tax collection. Design/methodology/approach – A static, political-gain approach was used to model employment in the tax collection sector and then the implications of an increase in revenue pressure were derived through a comparative statics method. Findings – As revenue pressure increases, the “political value” in terms of granting employment falls and thus efficiency resulting from purely political motives decreases. Originality/value – This paper is an original work.
Volume (Year): 4 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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