Does board governance improve the quality of accounting earnings?
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the contention that a strengthening of corporate governance mechanisms would result in the improved relevance and reliability of financial statements. Design/methodology/approach – Using pooled ordinary least squares regression, the paper analyse the quality of reported earnings for a sample of firms over the 1998-2002 time period. Findings – The findings show negative and statistically significant associations between reported earnings quality and the proportion of CEO incentive pay and firm's growth opportunities. It is also found that earnings quality is positively and significantly related to the existence of an orderly CEO transition process. However, board independence does not seem to be associated with earnings quality. Research limitations/implications – Since the sample of firms is from the 1998 to 2002 period, consistent with the paper's motivation, the results may not generalize to the more recent time period. Practical implications – The results provide support for the argument that the current structure of executive pay does adversely impact the quality of reported earnings and hence provides a rationale for closer scrutiny of executive pay by regulatory bodies. Additionally, the findings suggest that the emphasis on board independence as an effective monitoring device may be misplaced. Originality/value – Unlike prior studies, the paper's hypotheses are derived from an explicit agency theoretic optimization model of managerial decision making. The paper uses the Ball and Shivakumar model for estimating abnormal accruals unlike previous analyses that relied more heavily on the Jones model. The paper also adds to past studies of the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality and the role of executive compensation.
Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.emeraldinsight.com|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Emerald Group Publishing, Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley, BD16 1WA, UK|
Web: http://emeraldgrouppublishing.com/products/journals/journals.htm?id=arj Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Collins, Daniel W. & Hribar, Paul, 2000. "Earnings-based and accrual-based market anomalies: one effect or two?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 101-123, February.
- Ryan Davidson & Jenny Goodwin-Stewart & Pamela Kent, 2005. "Internal governance structures and earnings management," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 45(2), pages 241-267.
- Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Lobo, Gerald J. & Whalen, Dennis J., 2007. "Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements?," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 497-522.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
" A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jeffery Abarbanell & Reuven Lehavy, 2003. "Can Stock Recommendations Predict Earnings Management and Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 1-31, 03.
- Vafeas, Nikos, 2000. "Board structure and the informativeness of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 139-160, June.
- Ray Ball & Lakshmanan Shivakumar, 2006. "The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss Recognition," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 207-242, 05.
- Daniel Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, 2003.
"CEO incentives and earnings management,"
862, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Cornett, Marcia Millon & Marcus, Alan J. & Tehranian, Hassan, 2008. "Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: The impact of earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 357-373, February.
- Scott Whisenant & Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy & K. Raghunandan, 2003. "Evidence on the Joint Determination of Audit and Non-Audit Fees," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 721-744, 09.
- Roberta Romano, 2004. "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2653, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jul 2005.
- Agrawal, Anup & Chadha, Sahiba, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 371-406, October.
- Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Jarrell, Gregg, 1997. "Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-220, June.
- Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
- Mark C. Anderson & Rajiv D. Banker & Sury Ravindran, 2000. "Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(4), pages 530-547, April.
- Gary K. Meek & Ramesh P. Rao & Christopher J. Skousen, 2007. "Evidence on factors affecting the relationship between CEO stock option compensation and earnings management," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 304-323, August.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:arjpps:v:23:y:2010:i:1:p:49-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Louise Lister)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.