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The Theoretical Analysis of Income Tax Evasion Revisited

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  • E Gahramanov

Abstract

There exists an important puzzle in the income tax evasion literature, that higher tax rates unambiguously encourage tax compliance (Yitzhaki?s (1974) result). In this paper I show that by simply relaxing the assumption that higher tax rates necessarily translate into higher penalty payments at the initial optimum when caught, it is possible to generate rigorously an important extra disincentive to compliance, which is absent from the previous works. It can also be shown that Yitzhaki's (1974) result is a special case of the present formulation.

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  • E Gahramanov, 2009. "The Theoretical Analysis of Income Tax Evasion Revisited," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 14(1), pages 35-42, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eis:articl:109gahramanov
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cowell, Frank A. & P.F. Gordon, James, 1988. "Unwillingness to pay : Tax evasion and public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 305-321, August.
    2. Crane, Steven E. & Nourzad, Farrokh, 1990. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence From California Amnesty Data," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 43(2), pages 189-199, June.
    3. Yaniv, Gideon, 1999. "Tax Compliance and Advance Tax Payments: A Prospect Theory Analysis," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 4), pages 753-64, December.
    4. Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N., 1993. "Audit selection and income tax underreporting in the tax compliance game," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-33, October.
    5. Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1987. "On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 15(2), pages 123-137, April.
    6. Koskela, Erkki, 1983. "A note on progression, penalty schemes and tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 127-133, October.
    7. Yaniv, Gideon, 1999. "Tax Compliance and Advance Tax Payments: A Prospect Theory Analysis," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(4), pages 753-764, December.
    8. Pencavel, John H., 1979. "A note on income tax evasion, labor supply, and nonlinear tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 115-124, August.
    9. Crane, Steven E. & Nourzad, Farrokh, 1990. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from California Amnesty Data," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 43(2), pages 189-99, June.
    10. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-373, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Banele Dlamini, 2017. "Determinants of Tax Non-Compliance among Small and Medium Enterprises in Zimbabwe," Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, AMH International, vol. 9(4), pages 242-250.
    2. Ebele S. Nwokoye & Clement I. Igbanugo & Chukwunonso Ekesiobi & Stephen K. Dimnwobi, 2022. "Fiscal Incentives and Tax Compliance Behaviour in Industrial Clusters: A Survey of Clusters in South-East Nigeria," Working Papers of the African Governance and Development Institute. 22/008, African Governance and Development Institute..
    3. Richard J. Cebula, 2013. "New and Current Evidence on Determinants of Aggregate Federal Personal Income Tax Evasion in the United States," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(3), pages 701-731, July.
    4. Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto, 2018. "The Effects of Penalty Information on Tax Compliance: Evidence from a New Zealand Field Experiment," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 71(3), pages 547-588, September.
    5. Cebula, Richard & Coombs, Christopher, 2008. "Do Government-Spending-Induced Deficits Lower Tax Compliance?," MPRA Paper 50121, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Apr 2009.
    6. Richard J. Cebula, 2014. "The underground economy in the U.S.A.: preliminary new evidence on the impact of income tax rates (and other factors) on aggregate tax evasion 1975-2008," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 67(271), pages 451-481.
    7. Cebula, Richard J., 2011. "Aggregate Income Tax Evasion: Empirical Results Using new IRS Data for the U.S. - L’evasione aggregata del reddito: risultati empirici ottenuti utilizzando i nuovi dati IRS per gli USA," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 64(4), pages 423-443.
    8. Sandra Aulia & Haula Rosdiana & Inayati Inayati, 2022. "Trust, Power, and Tax Risk into the “Slippery Slope”: A Corporate Tax Compliance Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(22), pages 1-18, November.
    9. Cebula, Richard & Foley, Maggie, 2010. "Personal Income Tax Evasion Determinants Revisited: An Exploratory Study Using Newly Available Data," MPRA Paper 52028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
    11. Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto, 2018. "The Effects of Penalty Information on Tax Compliance: Evidence from a New Zealand Field Experiment," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 71(3), pages 547-588, September.

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