Fraude fiscale et offre de travail au noir
A well-known result in the theoretical literature on income tax evasion states that higher tax rates reduce tax evasion, in contrast to common sense beliefs on the matter. When tax evasion is interpreted in terms of the allocation of one's work effort between a "registered" and an "unregistered" labour market, this result is shown not to hold if, as seems reasonable, the wage rate for undeclared work is less than the before tax wage rate for declared work. Un résultat bien connu de la littérature théorique sur la fraude fiscale montre que des taux d’imposition élevés sur le revenu constituent une désincitation à la fraude, contrairement à ce que laisserait croire le sens commun. En interprétant la fraude fiscale comme une décision de participation au marché du travail non déclaré, on montre ici que ce résultat ne tient plus lorsque, ce qui semble vraisemblable, le taux de salaire au noir est inférieur au taux de salaire avant impôt gagné sur le marché du travail déclaré.
Volume (Year): 63 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (juin et septembre)
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- Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1987. "On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, SAGE Publishing, vol. 15(2), pages 123-137, April.
- Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August.
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