The Effects of Penalty Information on Tax Compliance: Evidence from a New Zealand Field Experiment
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- Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto, 2018. "The Effects of Penalty Information on Tax Compliance: Evidence from a New Zealand Field Experiment," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 71(3), pages 547-588, September.
- Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto, 2019. "The effects of penalty information on tax compliance: evidence from a New Zealand field experiment," Working Papers hal-02302534, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Pomeranz, Dina D. & Vila-Belda, José, 2019. "Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities," CEPR Discussion Papers 13688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cinzia Castiglioni & Edoardo Lozza & Eric Dijk & Wilco W. Dijk, 2019. "Two sides of the same coin? An investigation of the effects of frames on tax compliance and charitable giving," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 5(1), pages 1-10, December.
- Castro, Juan Francisco & Velásquez, Daniel & Beltrán, Arlette & Yamada, Gustavo, 2020.
"Spillovers and Long-Run Effects of Messages on Tax Compliance: Experimental Evidence from Peru,"
IZA Discussion Papers
13974, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Juan F. Castro & Daniel Velásquez & Arlette Beltrán & Gustavo Yamada, 2020. "Spillovers and Long Run Effects of Messages on Tax Compliance: Experimental Evidence from Peru," Working Papers 174, Peruvian Economic Association.
More about this item
Keywords
Tax evasion; Late payment penalties; Tax experiment; Goods and service tax;NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2018-01-01 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2018-01-01 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2018-01-01 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2018-01-01 (Public Economics)
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