Detecting and Correcting Election Fraud
I examine the provision of free and fair elections using a decision-theoretic model in which election observers provide a noisy information signal concerning fraud. Monitoring an election is not always worth the cost and so democracy is not always sustainable. A strong preference for fair elections can paradoxically make elections more difficult to monitor. Since fair elections are a public good, municipal election fraud result from Tiebout provision of this local public good. I offer several suggestions for organizations interested in facilitating the diffusion of democracy.
Volume (Year): 29 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
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