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Detecting and Correcting Election Fraud


  • Daniel Sutter

    () (Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma)


I examine the provision of free and fair elections using a decision-theoretic model in which election observers provide a noisy information signal concerning fraud. Monitoring an election is not always worth the cost and so democracy is not always sustainable. A strong preference for fair elections can paradoxically make elections more difficult to monitor. Since fair elections are a public good, municipal election fraud result from Tiebout provision of this local public good. I offer several suggestions for organizations interested in facilitating the diffusion of democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Sutter, 2003. "Detecting and Correcting Election Fraud," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 433-451, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:29:y:2003:i:3:p:433-451

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Leora Friedberg, 2000. "The Labor Supply Effects of the Social Security Earnings Test," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 48-63, February.
    2. Reimers, Cordelia & Honig, Marjorie, 1993. "The Perceived Budget Constraint under Social Security: Evidence from Reentry Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(1), pages 184-204, January.
    3. Meyer, Bruce D, 1995. "Natural and Quasi-experiments in Economics," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 13(2), pages 151-161, April.
    4. Gruber, Jonathan & Orszag, Peter, 2003. "Does the Social Security Earnings Test Affect Labor Supply and Benefits Receipt?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 56(4), pages 755-773, December.
    5. Stephen Rubb, 2002. "US Social Security rules in the 1990s: a natural experiment in myopic and farsighted behaviour," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(10), pages 637-640.
    6. Alan S. Blinder & Roger H. Gordon & Donald E. Wise, 1980. "Reconsidering the Work Disincentive Effects of Social Security," NBER Working Papers 0562, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ashish Chaturvedi, 2005. "Rigging elections with violence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 189-202, July.
    2. Gong, Jiong & McAfee, R. Preston & Williams, Michael, 2011. "Fraud cycles," MPRA Paper 28934, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item


    Democracy; Election;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior


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