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Detecting and Correcting Election Fraud

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Sutter

    (Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma)

Abstract

I examine the provision of free and fair elections using a decision-theoretic model in which election observers provide a noisy information signal concerning fraud. Monitoring an election is not always worth the cost and so democracy is not always sustainable. A strong preference for fair elections can paradoxically make elections more difficult to monitor. Since fair elections are a public good, municipal election fraud result from Tiebout provision of this local public good. I offer several suggestions for organizations interested in facilitating the diffusion of democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Sutter, 2003. "Detecting and Correcting Election Fraud," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 433-451, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:29:y:2003:i:3:p:433-451
    as

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    File URL: http://web.holycross.edu/RePEc/eej/Archive/Volume29/V29N3P433_451.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1989. "The Economics of Uncertainty and Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121360, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ashish Chaturvedi, 2005. "Rigging elections with violence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 189-202, July.
    2. Jiong Gong & R. Preston McAfee & Michael A. Williams, 2016. "Fraud Cycles," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(3), pages 544-572, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Election;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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