The Political Production of Superfund: Some Financial Market Results
In this article, we assess the prospective effects of different legislative packages by examining how financial markets reacted to alternate proposals and the final law. The use of financial markets analysis provides at least one avenue for identifying interest groups that won and lost as the major features of proposed legislation were modified. The analysis indirectly determines who pays for Superfund. Significant shareholder losses indicate shareholders pay. By contrast, the absence of wealth effects implies that consumers pay in the form of higher prices for chemical and other affected products.
Volume (Year): 22 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
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