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Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law

Author

Listed:
  • Wendy Naysnerski
  • Tom Tietenberg

Abstract

While the role of nongovernmental organizations in environmental policy is growing rapidly, our analytical understanding of the causes and consequences of this emerging role has not kept pace. In the 1970s, Congress authorized private organizations to seek injunctions (and in some cases penalties) against firms violating the terms of their environmental operating permits. The economic models in this paper show how the varying remedies, limitations, and reimbursement procedures can affect both the level and patterns of litigation activity as well as the compliance consequences. A database containing information on 1,205 cases is used to infuse empirical content into the analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Wendy Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, 1992. "Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(1), pages 28-48.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:68:y:1992:i:1:p:28-48
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2012. "Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 264-286, December.
    2. Earnhart, Dietrich, 2004. "Regulatory factors shaping environmental performance at publicly-owned treatment plants," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 655-681, July.
    3. Heyes, Anthony G., 1997. "Environmental Regulation by Private Contest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 407-428, February.
    4. Langpap, Christian & Shimshack, Jay P., 2010. "Private citizen suits and public enforcement: Substitutes or complements?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 235-249, May.
    5. Gramig, Benjamin M. & Skees, Jerry R. & Black, J. Roy, 2004. "Utilizing Contingent Claims to Improve the Management of CAFOs," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 36(02), August.
    6. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August.
    7. Lasserre, Pierre, 1994. "La Genèse, les coûts de transaction et l’économie de l’environnement," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(4), pages 383-397, décembre.
    8. Chad Settle & Jason Shogren, 2001. "Environmental conflicts with SLAPP reputations," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 4(2), pages 129-139, June.
    9. Ashenmiller Bevin & Norman Catherine Shelley, 2011. "Measuring the Impact of Anti-SLAPP Legislation on Monitoring and Enforcement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-19, November.
    10. Dietrich Earnhart, 2004. "Panel Data Analysis of Regulatory Factors Shaping Environmental Performance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 391-401, February.
    11. Lasserre, Pierre, 1994. "Protection décentralisée des droits de propriété, police et justice," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(2), pages 177-189, juin.
    12. Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
    13. Brett Dalton & David Riggs & Bruce Yandle, 1996. "The Political Production of Superfund: Some Financial Market Results," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 75-87, Winter.
    14. Dietrich Earnhart, 2000. "Environmental “Citizen Suits” in the Czech Republic," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 43-68, July.
    15. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February.
    16. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 361-378, June.
    17. Christian Langpap, 2015. "Voluntary agreements and private enforcement of environmental regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 99-116, February.
    18. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1997. "Environmental Conflicts and the SLAPP," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 253-273, July.

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