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Living Institutions: Sharing and Sanctioning Water among Pastoralists in Namibia

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  • Schnegg, Michael
  • Linke, Theresa

Abstract

Sanctions are often considered an important component of successful resource management. To govern water usage, pastoral communities in Namibia have specific sanctions at their disposal and yet these are almost never applied. Interestingly, this does not lead to a breakdown in water supply. To understand collective action in small communities it is important to take into account that people share multiple resources. Combining ethnography and network analysis we reveal that people cannot separate the sharing of water from the sharing of ancestries, food, and work. This discourages the application of formal sanctions while opening other means of maintaining institutional regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Schnegg, Michael & Linke, Theresa, 2015. "Living Institutions: Sharing and Sanctioning Water among Pastoralists in Namibia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 205-214.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:68:y:2015:i:c:p:205-214
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.11.024
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    3. Ishihara, Hiroe & Tokunaga, Kanae & Uchida, Hirotsugu, 2021. "Achieving multiple socio-ecological institutional fits: The case of spiny lobster co-management in Wagu, Japan," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    4. Mrittika Basu & Rajarshi DasGupta & Shizuka Hashimoto & Satoshi Hoshino, 2021. "A multi-actor and bottom-up perspective on attaining rural water security: qualitative evidence from India," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 1461-1484, February.
    5. Justin W. Webb & Theodore A. Khoury & Michael A. Hitt, 2020. "The Influence of Formal and Informal Institutional Voids on Entrepreneurship," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 44(3), pages 504-526, May.

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