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What Explains Collective Action in the Commons? Theory and Evidence from the Philippines

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  • Araral Jr., Eduardo

Abstract

Summary I examine the factors that influence collective action in the commons using econometric analyses on a data set of 1958 irrigation associations in the Philippines. I find that collective action is associated with water scarcity, proximity to markets, group size, farm size, and governance structure. Water scarcity has a curvilinear effect on collective action and is mediated by the governance structure. The results suggest the need for a diagnostic approach in the analysis of institutional arrangements in diverse socio-ecological settings. These also suggest that collective action in the commons is more complex than is conventionally assumed in the decentralization literature.

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  • Araral Jr., Eduardo, 2009. "What Explains Collective Action in the Commons? Theory and Evidence from the Philippines," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 687-697, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:37:y:2009:i:3:p:687-697
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    2. Borisova, Ekaterina, 2011. "Decision to make a HOA: Empirical evidence," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 24(4), pages 48-57.
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    5. Borisova, Ekaterina I. & Polishchuk, Leonid & Peresetsky, Anatoly, 2014. "Collective management of residential housing in Russia: The importance of being social," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 609-629.
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    7. Gorton, Matthew & Sauer, Johannes & Peshevski, Mile & Bosev, Dane & Shekerinov, Darko & Quarrie, Steve, 2009. "Water Communities in the Republic of Macedonia: An Empirical Analysis of Membership Satisfaction and Payment Behavior," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 1951-1963, December.
    8. Schnegg, Michael & Linke, Theresa, 2015. "Living Institutions: Sharing and Sanctioning Water among Pastoralists in Namibia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 205-214.
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    11. Steven M. Smith, 2016. "Common Property Resources and New Entrants: Uncovering the Bias and Effects of New Users," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-36.
    12. Behera, Bhagirath, 2009. "Explaining the performance of state-community joint forest management in India," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 177-185, November.
    13. Gatiso, Tsegaye T. & Vollan, Björn & Nuppenau, Ernst-August, 2015. "Resource scarcity and democratic elections in commons dilemmas: An experiment on forest use in Ethiopia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 199-207.
    14. Lorenz Gollwitzer & David Ockwell & Adrian Ely, 2015. "Institutional Innovation in the Management of Pro-Poor Energy Access in East Africa," SPRU Working Paper Series 2015-29, SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex.
    15. Ricks, Jacob I., 2016. "Building Participatory Organizations for Common Pool Resource Management: Water User Group Promotion in Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 34-47.
    16. Vining, Aidan R. & Richards, John, 2016. "Indigenous economic development in Canada: Confronting principal-agent and principal–principal problems to reduce resource rent dissipation," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 358-367.
    17. Juan Camilo Cardenas & Luz Angela Rodríguez & Nancy Johnson, 2014. "Vertical Collective Action: Addressing Vertical Asymmetries in Watershed Management," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 012608, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
    18. Junichi Ito, 2012. "Collective Action for Local Commons Management in Rural Yunnan, China: Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Using Evolutionary Game Theory," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 88(1), pages 181-200.
    19. Cavalcanti, Carina & Engel, Stefanie & Leibbrandt, Andreas, 2013. "Social integration, participation, and community resource management," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 262-276.
    20. Beitl, Christine M., 2014. "Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem: Individuals, Civil Society, and the Mangrove-Fishery Commons in Ecuador," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 93-107.
    21. Blanco, Esther & Lopez, Maria Claudia & Villamayor-Tomas, Sergio, 2015. "Exogenous degradation in the commons: Field experimental evidence," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 430-439.
    22. Cook, Nathan J. & Wright, Glenn D. & Andersson, Krister P., 2017. "Local Politics of Forest Governance: Why NGO Support Can Reduce Local Government Responsiveness," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 203-214.
    23. Pfaff, Alexander & Vélez, Maria Alejandra & Ramos, Pablo Andres & Molina, Adriana, 2015. "Framed field experiment on resource scarcity & extraction: Path-dependent generosity within sequential water appropriation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 416-429.
    24. Wang, Yahua & Chen, Chunliang & Araral, Eduardo, 2016. "The Effects of Migration on Collective Action in the Commons: Evidence from Rural China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 79-93.

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