Improving Design and Performance of Group Lending: Suggestions from Burkina Faso
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2006.
"Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability,"
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- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2011.
"When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?,"
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- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2010. "When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?," TSE Working Papers 10-146, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2010. "When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?," IDEI Working Papers 599, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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