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Regulation in a context of limited competition: A port case

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  • Defilippi, Enzo
  • Flor, Lincoln

Abstract

This paper explains the rationale of the regulatory framework developed by the Peruvian regulator for transport infrastructure, using the 2004 Price Review at Matarani port as an illustration. This framework is worth analyzing for several reasons: (i) it ensures that prices are regulated only where competition cannot be introduced; (ii) the regulatory framework is common to all transport infrastructures; (iii) experience in port regulation using RPI-X methodology is scarce; and (iv), the market is characterized by low levels of demand and limited competition. In addition, he results of the price review suggest that in contexts characterized by institutional limitations and limited competition, estimation of a retrospective X factor using the TFP technique is recommendable. Likewise, if the industry is dominated by state-owned firms, the X factor should be estimated using data from the concessionaire rather than from the industry. Other recommendations are also formulated.

Suggested Citation

  • Defilippi, Enzo & Flor, Lincoln, 2008. "Regulation in a context of limited competition: A port case," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 42(5), pages 762-773, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:transa:v:42:y:2008:i:5:p:762-773
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernstein, Jeffrey I & Sappington, David E M, 1999. "Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 5-25, July.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Lincoln Flor & Enzo Defilippi, 2003. "Port Infrastructure: An Access Model for the Essential Facility," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 5(2), pages 116-132, June.
    4. E Defilippi, 2004. "Intra-Port Competition, Regulatory Challenges and the Concession of Callao Port," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 6(4), pages 279-311, December.
    5. Malcolm Abbott & Su Wu, 2002. "Total Factor Productivity and Efficiency of Australian Airports," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 35(3), pages 244-260, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zheng, Shiyuan & Negenborn, Rudy R., 2014. "Centralization or decentralization: A comparative analysis of port regulation modes," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 21-40.
    2. Figueiredo De Oliveira, Gabriel & Cariou, Pierre, 2015. "The impact of competition on container port (in)efficiency," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 124-133.
    3. Álvarez-SanJaime, Óscar & Cantos-Sánchez, Pedro & Moner-Colonques, Rafael & Sempere-Monerris, José J., 2013. "Vertical integration and exclusivities in maritime freight transport," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 50-61.
    4. Enzo Defilippi, 2013. "X-factor estimation and controversies : the case of Lima´s airport," Working Papers 13-09, Centro de Investigación, Universidad del Pacífico.
    5. Zheng, Shiyuan & Ge, Ying-En & Fu, Xiaowen & Nie, Yu (Marco) & Xie, Chi, 2017. "Modeling collusion-proof port emission regulation of cargo-handling activities under incomplete information," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 543-567.
    6. Defilippi, Enzo, 2015. "X-factor regulation in a developing country: The case of Lima's airport," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 16-22.
    7. Gabriel F De Oliveira & Nicolas Peridy, 2019. "The trade-reducing effects of market power in international ports," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2674-2687.
    8. Shilin Ye & Xinhua Qi & Yecheng Xu, 2020. "Analyzing the relative efficiency of China’s Yangtze River port system," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 22(4), pages 640-660, December.

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