Uncertainty resolution in tax experiments: Why waiting for an audit increases compliance
Tax compliance in a between-subjects experiment was higher when the uncertainty about the occurrence of an audit was not resolved until three weeks after participants had filed their tax returns than in a control treatment with immediate uncertainty resolution. Results have important implications for experimental tax research where providing immediate feedback whether participants are audited is common practice.
Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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