Audit Lags and Taxpayer Compliance: A Simple Intertemporal Model
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- Muehlbacher, Stephan & Mittone, Luigi & Kastlunger, Barbara & Kirchler, Erich, 2012. "Uncertainty resolution in tax experiments: Why waiting for an audit increases compliance," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 289-291.
More about this item
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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