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Short-term economic incentives in new product development

  • Davila, Antonio
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research Policy.

    Volume (Year): 32 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 8 (September)
    Pages: 1397-1420

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:32:y:2003:i:8:p:1397-1420
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    1. Shenhar, Aaron J. & Dvir, Dov, 1996. "Toward a typological theory of project management," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 607-632, June.
    2. William G. Ouchi, 1979. "A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(9), pages 833-848, September.
    3. Marc H. Meyer & Peter Tertzakian & James M. Utterback, 1997. "Metrics for Managing Research and Development in the Context of the Product Family," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(1), pages 88-111, January.
    4. Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, 2000. "Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 273-293, Summer.
    5. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    6. Todd R. Zenger, 1994. "Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(6), pages 708-729, June.
    7. repec:oup:qjecon:v:109:y:1994:i:4:p:1125-56 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
    9. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    10. repec:oup:qjecon:v:117:y:2002:i:1:p:39-84 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Gibbons, R. & Murphy, K.J., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns: Theory And Evidence," Working papers 563, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    12. Lawrence M. Kahn & Peter D. Sherer, 1990. "Contingent pay and managerial performance," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 107-120, February.
    13. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    14. Scott Keating, A., 1997. "Determinants of divisional performance evaluation practices," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 243-273, December.
    15. repec:oup:qjecon:v:102:y:1987:i:1:p:147-59 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. John R. Hauser, 1998. "Research, Development, and Engineering Metrics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(12-Part-1), pages 1670-1689, December.
    17. Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July.
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