Price discrimination and the location choice of a durable goods monopoly
The traditional analysis of the location choice by a monopoly has been developed thinking of static monopolies, namely monopolies selling non-durable goods. At the same time, the spatial approach has been widely used in applications to the choice of product design. In a spatial context, the question is if monopoly power leads to the plant location which minimizes transport costs. In terms of product characteristics the question is whether a monopoly will produce the variety which maximizes the social welfare—I do not treat here the case of multiplant and multiproduct monopoly. The definition of product specification by way of spatial models, following Hotelling (1931), is usually one of horizontal differentiation, where the consumers do not unanimously rank the different specifications of a good footnote .
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Malueg, David A. & Schwartz, Marius, 1994.
"Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 167-195, November.
- Malueg, D.A. & Schwartz, M., 1993. "Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion and International Price Discrimination," Papers 93-6, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1986. "On the Nature of Competition with Differentiated Products," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(381), pages 160-172, March.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & THISSE, Jacques-François, "undated". "On the nature of competition with differentiated products," CORE Discussion Papers RP 685, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1996. "Horizontal and vertical differentiation: The Launhardt model," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 485-506, June.
- Dos Santos Ferreira, R. & Thisse, J.-F., "undated". "Horizontal and vertical differentiation: The Launhardt model," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1216, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Layson, Stephen K, 1994. "Market Opening under Third-Degree Price Discrimination," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 335-340, September.
- Maria Paz Espinosa, 1992. "Delivered Pricing, FOB Pricing, and Collusion in Spatial Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 64-85, Spring.
- Kahn, Charles M, 1986. "The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 275-294, March.
- Vincenzo Denicolo' & Paolo Garella, 1999. "Rationing in a Durable Goods Monopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 44-55, Spring.
- Patrick DeGraba, 1995. "Buying Frenzies and Seller-Induced Excess Demand," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 331-342, Summer.
- Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-332, April.
- Jeremy Bulow, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 729-749.
- Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-149, April.
- Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 1991. "Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 571-581, Winter. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:32:y:2002:i:6:p:765-773. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.