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Partially revocable commitments in a negotiation with a deadline

  • Calabuig, Vicent
  • Cunyat, Antoni
  • Olcina, Gonzalo

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WWP-4DSW64J-5/2/6ebfe5d9caf51e9aea20e126ff00c0b8
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

Volume (Year): 58 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 371-380

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Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:58:y:2004:i:4:p:371-380
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April.
  2. Jehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu, 1993. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with "Externalities"," Discussion Paper Serie B 234, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
  4. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
  5. Vicent Calabuig & Antoni Cunyat & Gonzalo Olcina, 2002. "Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 61-78.
  6. Sobel, Joel & Takahashi, Ichiro, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 411-26, July.
  7. Busch, L-A. & Wen, Q., 1991. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9108, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
  8. Antoni Cunyat, 2004. "The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 455-465, January.
  9. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-35, November.
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