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Monotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining

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  • Robles, Jack

Abstract

We study ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric information regarding disagreement payoffs. Results from Mensch (2020a) are used to find conditions under which a monotonic Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists in these games. A standard single crossing assumption implies the existence when the action space is discrete. Stronger assumptions are required when continuum demands are allowed.

Suggested Citation

  • Robles, Jack, 2025. "Monotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:120:y:2025:i:c:s0304406825000710
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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