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Wealth tax enforcement in Sweden: Filing requirements and pre-populated returns

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  • Saez, Emmanuel
  • Seim, David

Abstract

This paper shows that two features of wealth tax administration in Sweden – (1) filing requirements and (2) pre-populated returns–have a large impact on compliance even in an environment with highly-developed third-party reporting through information returns. Up to 1993, all taxpayers had to fill in wealth information when filing the (joint) income and wealth tax return. In 1994–1996, only those with net wealth above the exemption threshold (approximately the top 10 %) needed to fill in wealth information. This leads to a very large reduction of about half of the number of taxpayers slightly above the wealth tax exemption threshold, and a reduction of about 20 % in the total number of wealth taxpayers above the threshold. Starting in 1997, Sweden began pre-populating wealth information on tax returns for taxpayers with third-party-reported net wealth above the exemption threshold. Symmetrically, this immediately doubles the number of taxpayers slightly above the threshold and increases the number of all wealth taxpayers by almost 20 %. The introduction of information returns for financial wealth in 1986 had a comparatively small impact on wealth reporting.

Suggested Citation

  • Saez, Emmanuel & Seim, David, 2025. "Wealth tax enforcement in Sweden: Filing requirements and pre-populated returns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 249(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:249:y:2025:i:c:s0047272725001380
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105440
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    References listed on IDEAS

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