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Containing piracy with product pricing, updating and protection investments

Author

Listed:
  • Kogan, Konstantin
  • Ozinci, Yaacov
  • Perlman, Yael

Abstract

We consider a monopolistic producer offering software that is updated periodically, but, by the end of one period, a pirated version is available at a transaction cost. This presents the consumers, who are different in terms of their willingness to pay for the original compared to the pirated version, with possible strategies for either buying a new product or pirating it. We address pricing and protection investment strategies to regain the profits affected by the piracy. In particular, we find that even when the transaction cost is exogenous, the producer does not necessarily want to fully price out the piracy. The decisive factor in such a case is the level of product newness relative to the transaction cost. If the producer is able to achieve high newness for the updated product relative to the transaction cost, then a high retail price ensures that he will gain the largest profit possible even though some of the demand will be lost due to piracy. On the other hand, when the transaction cost is endogenous, the producer may have two alternatives, in terms of profit, for dealing with the piracy—pricing the software out or investing heavily in software protection. As newness levels rise, the option of pricing out the piracy becomes increasingly preferable.

Suggested Citation

  • Kogan, Konstantin & Ozinci, Yaacov & Perlman, Yael, 2013. "Containing piracy with product pricing, updating and protection investments," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 468-478.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:144:y:2013:i:2:p:468-478
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.03.018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bae, Sang Hoo & Choi, Jay Pil, 2006. "A model of piracy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 303-320, September.
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    7. Khouja, Moutaz & Rajagopalan, Hari K. & Sharer, Elizabeth, 2010. "Coordination and incentives in a supplier-retailer rental information goods supply chain," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 279-289, February.
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    9. Yoon, Kiho, 2002. "The optimal level of copyright protection," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 327-348, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nikolay Zenkevich & Margarita Gladkova, 2016. "Price Competition on the Market of Counterfeiting Software," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-10, June.
    2. Waters, James, 2015. "Welfare implications of piracy with dynamic pricing and heterogeneous consumers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(3), pages 904-911.
    3. repec:eee:proeco:v:206:y:2018:i:c:p:184-195 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:eee:proeco:v:191:y:2017:i:c:p:74-84 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Zhao, Dan & Chen, Hongmin & Hong, Xianpei & Liu, Jingfang, 2014. "Technology licensing contracts with network effects," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 136-144.
    6. repec:eee:jbrese:v:77:y:2017:i:c:p:30-40 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Avinadav, Tal & Chernonog, Tatyana & Perlman, Yael, 2014. "Analysis of protection and pricing strategies for digital products under uncertain demand," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 54-64.

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    Keywords

    Piracy; Pricing; Protection Investment;

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