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Political connections and participation in global value chains: Evidence from MENA firms

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  • Aboushady, Nora
  • Zaki, Chahir

Abstract

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.

Suggested Citation

  • Aboushady, Nora & Zaki, Chahir, 2025. "Political connections and participation in global value chains: Evidence from MENA firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:89:y:2025:i:c:s0176268025001028
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102742
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    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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