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Interpersonal comparison in egalitarian societies

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  • Binmore, Ken

Abstract

When judging what is fair, how do we decide how much weight to assign to the conflicting interests of different classes of people? This subject has received some attention in a utilitarian context, but has been largely neglected in the case of egalitarian societies of the kind studied by John Rawls. My Game Theory and the Social Contract considers the problem for a toy society with only two citizens. This paper examines the theoretical difficulties in extending the discussion to societies with more than two citizens.

Suggested Citation

  • Binmore, Ken, 2010. "Interpersonal comparison in egalitarian societies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 294-301, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:3:p:294-301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    3. Binmore, Ken, 2007. "Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300574.
    4. Binmore, Ken, 2005. "Natural Justice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195178111.
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    Cited by:

    1. Manfred J. Holler & Martin A. Leroch, 2014. "Theories of justice and empirical results," Chapters,in: A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, chapter 6, pages 143-159 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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