Use and misuse of unemployment benefits for early retirement
Unemployment insurance (UI) in some countries is one of the most widely used routes to early retirement. Accordingly, firms lay off elderly workers whose wages exceed their productivity. These workers then receive unemployment benefits until they enter formal retirement, even though they have effectively already exited the labor market. To persuade them into finding the deal acceptable, they quite often may also receive some additional compensation from their employers. In this paper we consider three routes of transition from work to formal retirement that rely on UI: (i) standard unemployment compensation, (ii) public early retirement program yielding benefits higher than the unemployment compensation and (iii) unemployment compensation along with an income supplement provided by the former employer. The study examines under which conditions these three alternative practices can occur.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Annemiek Vuren & Daniel Vuuren, 2007.
"Financial Incentives in Disability Insurance in the Netherlands,"
Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 73-98, March.
- Annemiek van Vuren & Daniel van Vuuren, 2005. "Financial incentives in disability insurance in the Netherlands," CPB Discussion Paper 45, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Vincenzo Galasso, 2003. "Early Retirement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 12-36, January.
- J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Vincenzo Galasso, "undated". "Early retirement," Working Papers 2003-03, FEDEA.
- Conde-Ruiz, J.I. & Galasso, V., 2000. "Early Retirement," Economics Working Papers eco2000/24, European University Institute.
- Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2000. "Early Retirement," CEPR Discussion Papers 2589, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise, 1999. "Introduction to "Social Security and Retirement around the World"," NBER Chapters,in: Social Security and Retirement around the World, pages 1-35 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(11), pages 2259-2281, September.
- CREMER, Helmuth & LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie & PESTIEAU, Pierre, "undated". "Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1722, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Helmuth Cremer & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Pestieau, 2002. "Social Security, Retirement Age and Optimal Income Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 693, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise, 1999. "Social Security and Retirement around the World," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number grub99-1, Enero-Jun. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)