Board of director compensation in China: It pays to be connected
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DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101394
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More about this item
Keywords
Board networks; Director compensation; Director turnover;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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