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The dynamics of terrorist organizations

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  • Hausken, Kjell

Abstract

Terrorist organizations are most often comprised of ideologues, criminal mercenaries, and captive participants. Ideologues provide political purpose and direction and have a strong group commitment. However, every organization needs money to survive. For terrorist organizations this comes through capital support or through criminal activities. Mercenaries serve the organization by providing the latter but have a weak group commitment and may corrupt the organization‘s ideological purity. Captive participants have neither strong commitments nor strong personal financial interests, but cannot leave without repercussions. Factors are assessed influencing how the composition of an organization evolves through time. The three labor groups value each other differently which impacts their relative strengths. Capital sponsors may view criminal mercenaries as ideologically detrimental to the terrorist organization. Capital sponsoring may cause an ideologically conscious terrorist organization, while lacking capital may cause a criminal organization relying on mercenary labor. If the ideologues lose their commitment, or the mercenaries and captive participants jointly value each other more, the organization may also become criminal or go extinct. The article provides tools for understanding the evolution of terrorist organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Hausken, Kjell, 2019. "The dynamics of terrorist organizations," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 6(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:oprepe:v:6:y:2019:i:c:s2214716018303385
    DOI: 10.1016/j.orp.2019.100120
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    1. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    2. Firdaus Udwadia & George Leitmann & Luca Lambertini, 2006. "A dynamical model of terrorism," Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Hindawi, vol. 2006, pages 1-32, September.
    3. Kjell Hausken & Sheheryar Banuri & Dipak Gupta & Klaus Abbink, 2015. "Al Qaeda at the bar: coordinating ideologues and mercenaries in terrorist organizations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 57-73, July.
    4. Mark P. Kaminskiy & Bilal M. Ayyub, 2006. "Terrorist Population Dynamics Model," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(3), pages 747-752, June.
    5. Kjell Hausken & Dipak K. Gupta, 2016. "Determining the ideological orientation of terrorist organisations: the effects of government repression and organised crime," International Journal of Public Policy, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 12(1/2), pages 71-97.
    6. Kjell Hausken & Dipak K. Gupta, 2015. "Government protection against terrorism and crime," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 59-80, April.
    7. Hausken, Kjell, 2019. "Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 33-55.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Governmental combat of migration between competing terrorist organisations," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 30(3), pages 21-46.
    2. Xiao, Hui & Lin, Chen & Kou, Gang & Peng, Rui, 2020. "Optimal resource allocation for defending k-out-of-n systems against sequential intentional and unintentional impacts," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).

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