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A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium

  • Karagözoğlu, Emin
  • Keskin, Kerim
  • Sağlam, Çağrı

We introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, conduct an in-depth sensitivity analysis, and provide examples where minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium leads to improved predictions.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 66 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 422-430

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:422-430
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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