On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of responsive priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the deferred acceptance rule to satisfy a consistency principle. In this note, we extend this result to the domain of substitutable priorities, complementing results of Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kumano (2009).
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- Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
- Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
- Paul Milgrom, 2003.
"Matching with Contracts,"
03003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Fuhito Kojima & Mihai Manea, 2010. "Axioms for Deferred Acceptance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 633-653, 03.
- Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
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