The existence of equilibrium in games with randomly perturbed payoffs and applications to experimental economics
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- Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June.
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00/37, Department of Economics, University of York.
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"Learning, non-equilibrium beliefs, and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game,"
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- Miguel Costa-Gomes & Klaus G. Zauner, . "Learning, Non-equilibrium Beliefs, and Non-pecuniary Payoffs in an Experimental Game," Discussion Papers 00/59, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "Topologies on Information and Strategies in Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 463, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Richard McKelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1999. "An experimental study of the centipede game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 521, David K. Levine.
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