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Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction

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  • Amorós, Pablo

Abstract

A group of students who have applied for scholarships must be ranked. The committee responsible for determining this ranking consists of the students’ advisors. While impartial towards other students, the advisors are biased towards favoring their students. This paper examines the implementation of the deserving ranking via backward induction. Some of the best-known sequential mechanisms utilized in the real world are ineffective. We present two simple and natural sequential mechanisms that prove to be effective. The first mechanism is suitable for when there are precisely three students, and the second is for four or more students.

Suggested Citation

  • Amorós, Pablo, 2023. "Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:125:y:2023:i:c:p:1-10
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yadav, Sonal, 2016. "Selecting winners with partially honest jurors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 35-43.
    2. Adachi, Tsuyoshi, 2014. "A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 508-518.
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    6. Catonini, Emiliano & Penta, Antonio, 2022. "Backward Induction Reasoning beyond Backward Induction," TSE Working Papers 22-1298, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. Amoros, Pablo & Corchon, Luis C. & Moreno, Bernardo, 2002. "The Scholarship Assignment Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.
    8. JoseHerrero, Maria & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1992. "Implementation via backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 70-88, February.
    9. Sjostrom Tomas, 1994. "Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 502-511, May.
    10. Emiliano Cantonini & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Backward induction reasoning beyond backward induction," Economics Working Papers 1815, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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