IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juipol/v18y2010i4p195-200.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Using forward markets to improve electricity market design

Author

Listed:
  • Ausubel, Lawrence M.
  • Cramton, Peter

Abstract

Forward markets, both medium term and long term, complement the spot market for wholesale electricity. The forward markets reduce risk, mitigate market power, and coordinate new investment. In the medium term, a forward energy market lets suppliers and demanders lock in energy prices and quantities for one to three years. In the long term, a forward reliability market assures adequate resources are available when they are needed most. The forward markets reduce risk for both sides of the market, since they reduce the quantity of energy that trades at the more volatile spot price. Spot market power is mitigated by putting suppliers and demanders in a more balanced position at the time of the spot market. The markets also reduce transaction costs and improve liquidity and transparency. Recent innovations to the Colombia market illustrate the basic elements of the forward markets and their beneficial role.

Suggested Citation

  • Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Cramton, Peter, 2010. "Using forward markets to improve electricity market design," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 195-200, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:18:y:2010:i:4:p:195-200
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957-1787(10)00036-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2006. "The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity," Papers of Peter Cramton 06mdfra, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2006.
    2. Peter Cramton, 2007. "Colombia’s Forward Energy Market," Papers of Peter Cramton 07fem, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007.
    3. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft & Jeffrey West, 2006. "Simulation of the Colombian Firm Energy Market," Papers of Peter Cramton 06scfem, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2006.
    4. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Auctioning Many Divisible Goods," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 480-493, 04/05.
    5. Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven, 2008. "Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market power, more efficiency," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 194-201, September.
    6. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2007. "Colombia Firm Energy Market," Papers of Peter Cramton 07cfem, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007.
    7. Oren, Shmuel S., 2005. "Generation Adequacy via Call Options Obligations: Safe Passage to the Promised Land," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 18(9), pages 28-42, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Biggar, Darryl R. & Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza, 2022. "An integrated theory of dispatch and hedging in wholesale electric power markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    2. Michele Fioretti & Jorge Tamayo, 2021. "Saving for a Dry Day: Coal, Dams, and the Energy Transition," Working Papers hal-03389152, HAL.
    3. Olaya, Yris & Arango-Aramburo, Santiago & Larsen, Erik R., 2016. "How capacity mechanisms drive technology choice in power generation: The case of Colombia," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 563-571.
    4. Remco van Eijkel & Jose Luis Moraga, 2010. "Do Firms sell forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. van Eijkel, Remco & Kuper, Gerard H. & Moraga-González, José L., 2016. "Do firms sell forward for strategic reasons? An application to the wholesale market for natural gas," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-35.
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1qif9fqehq930ovnr511k1el4f is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Ramos, Ariana & De Jonghe, Cedric & Gómez, Virginia & Belmans, Ronnie, 2016. "Realizing the smart grid's potential: Defining local markets for flexibility," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 26-35.
    8. Dzikri Firmansyah Hakam, 2023. "Mitigating Market Power and Promoting Competition in Electricity Markets through a Preventive Approach: The Role of Forward Contracts," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(8), pages 1-31, April.
    9. Liu, Shuangquan & Yang, Qiang & Cai, Huaxiang & Yan, Minghui & Zhang, Maolin & Wu, Dianning & Xie, Mengfei, 2019. "Market reform of Yunnan electricity in southwestern China: Practice, challenges and implications," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-1.
    10. Álvarez-Uribe, Karla C. & Arango-Aramburo, Santiago & Larsen, Erik R., 2018. "Forward contracts in electricity markets and capacity investment: A simulation study," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 1-10.
    11. David A. Gautschi & Heidi C. Gautschi & Christopher L. Tucci, 2022. "What If? Electricity as Money," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-24, April.
    12. Rowan Adams & Tooraj Jamasb, 2016. "Optimal Power Generation Portfolios with Renewables: An Application to the UK," Working Papers EPRG 1620, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    13. Jemma J. Makrygiorgou & Christos-Spyridon Karavas & Christos Dikaiakos & Ioannis P. Moraitis, 2023. "The Electricity Market in Greece: Current Status, Identified Challenges, and Arranged Reforms," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-40, February.
    14. Ritz, Robert A., 2016. "How does renewables competition affect forward contracting in electricity markets?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 135-139.
    15. Fatras, Nicolas & Ma, Zheng & Duan, Hongbo & Jørgensen, Bo Nørregaard, 2022. "A systematic review of electricity market liberalisation and its alignment with industrial consumer participation: A comparison between the Nordics and China," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    16. Majah-Leah V. Ravago, 2023. "The Nature and Causes of High Philippine Electricity Price and Potential Remedies," Department of Economics, Ateneo de Manila University, Working Paper Series 202301, Department of Economics, Ateneo de Manila University.
    17. Cuervo, Felipe Isaza & Botero, Sergio Botero, 2016. "Wind power reliability valuation in a Hydro-Dominated power market: The Colombian case," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1359-1372.
    18. Wierzbowski, Michal & Filipiak, Izabela, 2017. "Enhanced operational reserve as a tool for development of optimal energy mix," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 602-615.
    19. Bajo-Buenestado, Raúl, 2017. "Welfare implications of capacity payments in a price-capped electricity sector: A case study of the Texas market (ERCOT)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 272-285.
    20. Arango, Santiago & Larsen, Erik, 2011. "Cycles in deregulated electricity markets: Empirical evidence from two decades," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2457-2466, May.
    21. John William Grimaldo Guerrero & Carlos Jimenez Rios & Lony Mu oz del Villar & Elio Gomez Carre o & Jorge Bola o Turyol, 2021. "Equity and Renewable Energy: An Analysis in Residential Users in the Department of Atl ntico-Colombia," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 11(4), pages 107-112.
    22. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2018. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 27, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
    23. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/1qif9fqehq930ovnr511k1el4f is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2019. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1059-1078.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels, 2012. "Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector," Papers of Peter Cramton 12cocap, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    2. Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven, 2008. "Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market power, more efficiency," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 194-201, September.
    3. Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels & Steven Stoft, 2013. "Capacity Market Fundamentals," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    4. Fontini, Fulvio & Vargiolu, Tiziano & Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2021. "Investing in electricity production under a reliability options scheme," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    5. Peter Cramton, 2009. "Innovation and Market Design," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 113-137.
    6. Wolfgang Buchholz & Jonas Frank & Hans-Dieter Karl & Johannes Pfeiffer & Karen Pittel & Ursula Triebswetter & Jochen Habermann & Wolfgang Mauch & Thomas Staudacher, 2012. "Die Zukunft der Energiemärkte: Ökonomische Analyse und Bewertung von Potenzialen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten," ifo Forschungsberichte, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 57.
    7. Juha Teirilä and Robert A. Ritz, 2019. "Strategic Behaviour in a Capacity Market? The New Irish Electricity Market Design," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(The New E).
    8. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2018. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 27, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
    9. Finon, Dominique & Pignon, Virginie, 2008. "Electricity and long-term capacity adequacy: The quest for regulatory mechanism compatible with electricity market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 143-158, September.
    10. Finon, Dominique & Meunier, Guy & Pignon, Virginie, 2008. "The social efficiency of long-term capacity reserve mechanisms," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 202-214, September.
    11. Kim, Hyunsook & Kim, Sung-Soo, 2012. "The resource adequacy scheme in the Korean electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 133-144.
    12. Meyer, Roland & Gore, Olga, 2015. "Cross-border effects of capacity mechanisms: Do uncoordinated market design changes contradict the goals of the European market integration?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 9-20.
    13. Simshauser, Paul, 2022. "Rooftop solar PV and the peak load problem in the NEM's Queensland region," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    14. Simshauser, P., 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2039, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    15. Simshauser, P. & Gilmore, J., 2020. "Is the NEM broken? Policy discontinuity and the 2017-2020 investment megacycle," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2048, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    16. Simshauser, Paul, 2019. "Missing money, missing policy and Resource Adequacy in Australia's National Electricity Market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-1.
    17. Elberg, Christina & Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market Structure," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79811, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. Heikki Peura & Derek W. Bunn, 2015. "Dynamic Pricing of Peak Production," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 63(6), pages 1262-1279, December.
    19. Holmberg, Pär & Tangerås, Thomas, 2021. "Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms," Working Paper Series 1387, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    20. Brown, David P., 2018. "Capacity payment mechanisms and investment incentives in restructured electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 131-142.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity market design Forward market Capacity market Firm energy market Resource adequacy;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:18:y:2010:i:4:p:195-200. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/utilities-policy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.