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The Manipulation: Socio-economic decision making

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  • Gurevich, Gregory
  • Kliger, Doron

Abstract

We analyze one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma decisions made by participants of the high-stakes TV game show The Manipulation, and document the influence of social life factors on economic decisions, alongside the participants’ rational considerations. In particular, we employ a social psychology approach to provide a new perspective on the determinants of financial assistance. Our insights from the TV game are corroborated by a controlled laboratory experiment. We find that helping and sharing behavior in strategic situations is explained by Attribution Theory (AT) and beliefs about expected cooperativeness. Specifically, participants’ decisions are influenced by perceived controllability of opponents’ conditions (an attributional characteristic influencing perception of responsibility and related emotions) and social-relations-based beliefs regarding the opponents’ expected cooperativeness.

Suggested Citation

  • Gurevich, Gregory & Kliger, Doron, 2013. "The Manipulation: Socio-economic decision making," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 171-184.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:39:y:2013:i:c:p:171-184
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2013.08.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Attribution; Cooperation; Emotions; Field experiment; Prisoners dilemma game;

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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