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Expectations and outcome: The role of Proposer features in the Ultimatum Game

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  • Marchetti, Antonella
  • Castelli, Ilaria
  • Harlé, Katia M.
  • Sanfey, Alan G.

Abstract

In social decision-making individuals make choices in an interactive context and their decisions may therefore be influenced by information they receive about features of the other player. These features may 'frame' the other player in particular ways and generate expectations about the outcome. This research examines the impact of information about the Proposer on the Responder's decision in the Ultimatum Game (UG). Two-hundred and forty undergraduates played the UG after being provided with different descriptions of the Proposer's (no information, physical description, psychological description). The results show that acceptance rates are significantly influenced by both offer fairness as well as the type of description. These results support the relevance of the expectation effects due to the framing in social decision making.

Suggested Citation

  • Marchetti, Antonella & Castelli, Ilaria & Harlé, Katia M. & Sanfey, Alan G., 2011. "Expectations and outcome: The role of Proposer features in the Ultimatum Game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 446-449, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:446-449
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Burnham, Terence & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L., 2000. "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-73, September.
    2. Alan Sanfey, 2009. "Expectations and social decision-making: biasing effects of prior knowledge on Ultimatum responses," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 8(1), pages 93-107, June.
    3. Sutter, Matthias, 2007. "Outcomes versus intentions: On the nature of fair behavior and its development with age," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 69-78, January.
    4. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2003. "On the Nature of Fair Behavior," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(1), pages 20-26, January.
    5. Solnick, Sara J. & Schweitzer, Maurice E., 1999. "The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 199-215, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nebiyou Tilahun & David Levinson, 2013. "Selfishness and altruism in the distribution of travel time and income," Transportation, Springer, vol. 40(5), pages 1043-1061, September.
    2. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    3. Pedro Moreira, 2015. "The Perception of Economic Value Limits: A Study on the Ultimatum Game Decision Patterns," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 2503337, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
    4. Wiederhold, Simon & Riener, Gerhard, 2012. "Hidden Costs of Control in Social Groups," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 65407, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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