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Expectations and outcome: The role of Proposer features in the Ultimatum Game

  • Marchetti, Antonella
  • Castelli, Ilaria
  • Harlé, Katia M.
  • Sanfey, Alan G.
Registered author(s):

    In social decision-making individuals make choices in an interactive context and their decisions may therefore be influenced by information they receive about features of the other player. These features may 'frame' the other player in particular ways and generate expectations about the outcome. This research examines the impact of information about the Proposer on the Responder's decision in the Ultimatum Game (UG). Two-hundred and forty undergraduates played the UG after being provided with different descriptions of the Proposer's (no information, physical description, psychological description). The results show that acceptance rates are significantly influenced by both offer fairness as well as the type of description. These results support the relevance of the expectation effects due to the framing in social decision making.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487011000493
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.

    Volume (Year): 32 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 3 (June)
    Pages: 446-449

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:446-449
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep

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    1. Alan Sanfey, 2009. "Expectations and social decision-making: biasing effects of prior knowledge on Ultimatum responses," Mind and Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 8(1), pages 93-107, June.
    2. Burnham, Terence & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L., 2000. "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-73, September.
    3. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "On the Nature of Fair Behaviour," CEPR Discussion Papers 2984, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Sutter, Matthias, 2007. "Outcomes versus intentions: On the nature of fair behavior and its development with age," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 69-78, January.
    5. Solnick, Sara J. & Schweitzer, Maurice E., 1999. "The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 199-215, September.
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