Decisions and strategies in a sequential search experiment
The strategy method is becoming an important tool in experimentalmethodology. This study examines how well this method works in anindividual decision experiment. Subjects are faced with a sequentialsearch problem. After extensive practice solving the problem andformulating strategies, they play 20 periods for money. In eachperiod the subjects first make decisions by hand, and after thattheir strategy operates on the same sequence of bids. Each periodonly one of the results is paid out (randomly determined). After eachperiod subjects can change their strategy. This method makes a directcomparison between strategies and decisions possible.
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