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Will Mandatory Licensing and Standards Raise the Quality of Real Estate Appraisals? Some Insights from Agency Theory

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  • Rudolph, Patricia M.

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  • Rudolph, Patricia M., 1998. "Will Mandatory Licensing and Standards Raise the Quality of Real Estate Appraisals? Some Insights from Agency Theory," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 165-179, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:7:y:1998:i:2:p:165-179
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yavas, Abdullah, 1995. "Seller-Broker Relationship as a Double Moral Hazard Problem," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 244-263, September.
    2. Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-1346, December.
    3. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    4. Anglin, Paul M & Arnott, Richard, 1991. "Residential Real Estate Brokerage as a Principal-Agent Problem," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 99-125, June.
    5. Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 843-862.
    6. Michael A. Arnold, 1992. "The Principal‐Agent Relationship in Real Estate Brokerage Services," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 20(1), pages 89-106, March.
    7. Barry A. Diskin & Dean H. Gatzlaff, 1994. "An Examination of the Earnings of Real Estate Appraisers," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 9(4), pages 507-524.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Downs & Z. Güner, 2012. "Information Producers and Valuation: Evidence from Real Estate Markets," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 167-183, January.
    2. Stephan Bartke & Reimund Schwarze, 2021. "The Economic Role and Emergence of Professional Valuers in Real Estate Markets," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-20, June.
    3. Fernando A. F. Ferreira & Ronald W. Spahr & Mark A. Sunderman & Audrius Banaitis & João J. M. Ferreira, 2017. "A learning-oriented decision-making process for real estate brokerage service evaluation," Service Business, Springer;Pan-Pacific Business Association, vol. 11(3), pages 453-474, September.
    4. Bartke, Stephan, 2015. "The economic role of valuers in real property markets," UFZ Discussion Papers 13/2015, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).

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