Stockpiling anti-viral drugs for a pandemic: The role of Manufacturer Reserve Programs
To promote stockpiling of anti-viral drugs by non-government organizations such as hospitals, drug manufacturers have introduced Manufacturer Reserve Programs which, for an annual fee, provide the right to buy in the event of a severe outbreak of influenza. We show that these programs enhance drug manufacturer profits but could either increase or decrease the amount of pre-pandemic stockpiling of anti-viral drugs.
References listed on IDEAS
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